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Abstract
When explaining the ubiquity of rankings, researchers tend to emphasize macro or contextual phenomena, such as the
power of or the trust in numbers, neoliberal forces, or a general spirit of competition.Meanwhile, the properties of rankers
are rarely, if at all, taken into account. In contrast to the received wisdom, we argue that the institutionalization of rankings
in different fields is also contingent upon another, often-neglected factor: Over time, rankers have become increasingly
more organized. To investigate the role of ranking organizations, we look into the distinct properties of present-day rank-
ings and highlight three dimensions along which rankings have evolved over the course of the twentieth century, namely,
publication frequency, handling complex tasks, and audience engagement. On this basis, we argue that these dimensions
have to a large extent been affected by formal organization and we show how ranking organizations have over time devel-
oped capacities to: (a) publish rankings on a continual basis; (b) handle the often complex production process by means
of division of labor; and (c) generate considerable degrees of attention by addressing large and diverse audiences. On a
more general note, we argue that accounting for the role of organization in the instutionalization of rankings requires a
combination of insights from both “old” and “new” strands of thinking in institutional theory.
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1. Introduction
Higher education, sports, business, human development,
and the arts are only some among the growing num-
ber of areas which are nowadays routinely subjected to
novel forms of quantified comparisons and monitoring.
Among these, rankings stand out as particularly perva-
sive and impactful. Be it the Human Development Index,
which the United Nations Development Programme uses
to measure the development of nations, TripAdvisor’s
Popularity Index listing the best restaurants and hotels
in a city, or the Times Higher Education’s (THE) World
University Rankings comparing universities on a world-
wide scale—rankings, it seems, play an increasingly im-
portant role in the contemporary world.
The extant literature, however, rarely addresses the
problem of why rankings have become so pervasive.
Instead, the effectiveness of rankings is often taken for
granted, while little is added to the explanation of the
social processes undergirding their institutionalization.
Rather, the literature tends to refer to broader trends
in society which rankings are part of, such as the onset
of digitalization (Mau, 2019), the aura of rationality sur-
rounding numbers (Espeland & Stevens, 2008), the insti-
tutionalized trust in numbers (Porter, 1996), the growing
importance of performancemeasurement in governance
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(Mehrpouya & Samiolo, 2016), neoliberalism (Münch,
2014), or even a general spirit of competition inmankind
(de Rijcke, Wallenburg, Wouters, & Bal, 2016).
Following our earlier work, we see the institution-
alization of rankings as intimately connected to discur-
sive processes unfolding historically in different fields
(Brankovic, Ringel, & Werron, 2018; Ringel & Werron, in
press;Werron& Ringel, 2017). In plain terms, as rankings
become increasingly more present in public discourse,
be it as objects of praise, criticism or simply “neutral”
reporting, they are more likely to become institution-
alized. An integral part of this process is that rankings
keep the ranked “on their toes”: they create pressure for
those who are subject to them to strive to not lose their
position, maintain it, or improve it (Espeland & Sauder,
2016; Esposito & Stark, 2019). However, we know only
little about if and how rankers themselves add to this,
given that they are routinely overlooked in the extant
literature (Rindova, Martins, Srinivas, & Chandler, 2018).
So far, we have learned only little about the properties,
practices, and strategies devised by producers of rank-
ings and how they intersect with or add to the discur-
sive institutionalization.
What is then to be said about those who produce
rankings? While for a long time the process has pre-
dominantly been undertaken by individuals who acted
in their personal capacity as, for example, scientists or
critics, and who typically had only marginal organiza-
tional support, contemporary rankings are usually pro-
duced by organizations of various kinds, such as for-
profit businesses, newspapers, international governmen-
tal and non-governmental organizations, or universities.
A closer look at some of the well-known inventories of
rankings and similar devices (e.g., Bandura, 2011; Kelley
& Simmons, 2014) reveals that the most “successful”—
that is, regularly published, well-known, and impactful—
rankings today are the product of organizational efforts
and were first published usually between the 1980s and
early-to-mid 2000s.
To address this, in this article we examine the (largely
neglected) role of organizations in the rise and discursive
institutionalization of rankings. Broadly speaking, when
it comes to the pervasiveness of organizations in mod-
ern society, two explanations have dominated organi-
zational scholarship throughout the twentieth century
(Selznick, 1996; Stinchcombe, 1997). One body of liter-
ature in organizational institutionalism, that is, the so-
called “old” one, stresses the capabilities of formal or-
ganizations to complete complex and resource-intensive
tasks as opposed to other forms of social organization.
In contrast, the new institutionalist perspective, which
emerged partly in response to the old institutionalist tra-
dition, explains the explosion in numbers of organiza-
tions populating the globe by emphasizing that formal or-
ganization itself has become a cultural institution grant-
ing legitimacy to those embracing it (Meyer & Bromley,
2013;Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In simplified terms, formal
organizing thus abounds either because it has proven
effective or because it is legitimate. Although, by and
large, the legitimacy argument is today considered a su-
perior approach to this old question, we argue that re-
visiting the tenets of old institutionalism holds promise
for exposing some overlooked elements of the rank-
ings phenomenon.
With these two potential trajectories of explanation
in mind, in this article we review empirical studies fo-
cusing on the producers of rankings in a diverse set of
fields, particularly, in the arts, science and higher edu-
cation, education, tourism, and business. Specifically: in
the first step we (a) scan the literature on rankings to
identify potential relations between the organizational
expansion and the rise of rankings; and, in the second
step, we (b) look for evidence of the effectiveness argu-
ment, rather than that of cultural legitimacy, in the role
organizations play in the institutionalization of rankings.
By unveiling the properties, practices, and strategies de-
vised by key actors in discursive arenas, the producers of
rankings, we wish to open a new avenue in the broader
research on their global institutionalization (Brankovic
et al., 2018; Ringel & Werron, in press).
2. The Rise of Organizations: New Institutionalism and
the “Old”
Since the nineteenth century and particularly since the
end ofWorldWar II, we are witnessing a rampant spread
of organizations across sectors of society (Drori,Meyer, &
Hwang, 2006; Meyer & Bromley, 2013). The new institu-
tional theory, in the tradition of Meyer, Rowan, Powell,
DiMaggio, and others (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Powell &
DiMaggio, 1991), argues that formal organization as such
has become a cultural institution embodying and symbol-
izing the promise of our highest ideals of rationality. The
often described “rationalization” of society over the past
decades, that is, the spread of universalized and abstract
cultural beliefs and templates about equality, education,
human rights, gender and so forth, thus “creates a frame-
work that encourages organizing in a wide range of soci-
eties and domains” (Meyer & Bromley, 2013, p. 367) be-
yond actual functional necessities. These beliefs and tem-
plates are to a large degree theorized and legitimized by
science—a process that new institutional theory refers
to as “scientization” (Drori et al., 2006). Modern world
society is therefore made up of a dense latticework of
scientized norms, values, standards, beliefs, and ideas,
all of which are connected to specific visions of organi-
zational actorhood. Accordingly, studies in this tradition
have shown that organizations are often more busy in-
corporating such structures so as to adhere to so-called
“rationalized myths” in order to be granted legitimacy by
their environment.
How do scientized templates about formal organi-
zation and organizational governance find their way to
the public and, by extension, trigger the creation of, or
change in existing organizations? How are they, as insti-
tutional theory would have it, diffused? The literature
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 36–47 37
suggests two sets of answers. One builds upon the work
of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) which conceives of soci-
ety as comprising amultitude of organizational fields and
outlines three isomorphic processes of diffusing organi-
zational templates within fields: coercive (organizational
structures are diffused via laws or otherwise formally
binding rules based upon sanctions); normative (orga-
nizational structures are diffused based upon the belief
that they are “right”); and mimetic (organizational struc-
tures are diffused because they are taken for granted).
The other draws on Strang and Meyer (1993) who em-
phasize that cultural templates often do not travel di-
rectly through communicative networks, but are diffused
indirectly, for instance, through observation. They ar-
gue that cultural templates are more likely to be spread
when they are theorized: “By theorization we mean
the self-conscious development and specification of ab-
stract categories and the formulation of patterned re-
lationships such as chains of cause and effect” (Strang
& Meyer, 1993, p. 492). Building upon these insights,
Werron (2014) suggests defining observers who create
such theorizations as “universalized third parties.” Such
third parties, of which the producers of rankings are an
example, specialize in publicly observing actors and ad-
dressing audiences, thereby indirectly creating pressure
among the said actors to follow the dominant models.
Capabilities of formal organizations, therefore, do
not play a major role in the institutionalization of formal
organization. According to the new institutionalist line of
argument and evidence, formal organizations, put sim-
ply, do not necessarily exist in such great numbers be-
cause they are (more) effective (than other forms of so-
cial organization). If and underwhich circumstances orga-
nizations are or need to be effective in carrying out cer-
tain tasks, is then a completely different and, from the
perspective of this tradition, secondary question, or at
least one that it empirically rarely explores.
In the large body of literature which attributes the
rise of formal organization to its superior capabilities to
achieve certain tasks, for instance when it comes to ad-
ministering a region or a country, producing goods, and
taking care of the sick, three classics are worth revisit-
ing here. Weber (1915/1947) famously defined organi-
zations as beacons of western rationality due to their
unique properties: They produce written rules of con-
duct, outline specific spheres of competence, divide la-
bor, have clear-cut authority structures, employ trained
personnel to fill positions, have some degree of discre-
tion in resource allocation, and have members who typ-
ically do not own the means of production but instead
receive wages. Barnard (1938) argued that creating for-
mal organizations becomes a necessity when individuals
face too many goals and tasks which are too complex for
them to accomplish on their own. He also stressed the
importance of informality as a complementary mode of
action and mechanism to increase support among em-
ployees. Coase (1937) was also interested in question as
to why individuals feel the necessity to create formal or-
ganizations. He highlighted the transaction costs one has
to carry when working towards achieving a goal and em-
phasized that there are essentially two options: Services
can either be bought on amarket ormade. In complex sit-
uations, for example, when frequent discussions, delib-
erations, and negotiations are necessary, or, when prod-
ucts have to be constantly refined and repaired, seeking
vertical integration by means of creating a formal orga-
nization is more rational than buying these services on
a market.
In the following decades, a vast body of schol-
arship critically engaged with these contributions.
Nevertheless, they in principle maintained that formal
organizations were amodern institution that, for all their
flaws, arguably still did some thingsmore effectively than
any other form of social organizing and is for this reason
an all-pervasive feature of modern society. In public ad-
ministration studies, for instance, Simon (1945) notably
argued that due to anthropological cognitive constraints,
individuals exceed their analytical capabilities quickly
and thus need to be able to cooperate with others in
order to compensate for their imperfections. As a result,
organizations are characterized by “bounded rational-
ity”: They do act rationally only to a certain degree—and
more so than any other type of collective actor (Simon,
1957). This, Simon explains, is because organizations al-
low individuals to specialize (for example, by observing
the environment only in legalistic terms as a company
lawyer), which allows them to put their limited cogni-
tive abilities to better use than if they had to consider a
multiplicity of aspects (we could, for example, imagine a
lawyer who also had to be a PR manager and an expert
in the production of goods).
The first and second generation of American organi-
zational sociologists, among which are Robert K. Merton,
Philipp Selznick, and Alvin Gouldner, were particularly in-
terested in revisiting Weber’s claim of the superiority of
organizations by studying intra-organizational processes.
They unveiled a variety of unintended and sometimes
dysfunctional consequences. Nonetheless, as Selznick
(1996) and Stinchcombe (1997) argued, they as well ac-
knowledge that organizations are, to some degree, more
efficient and effective at accomplishing the tasks at hand.
They are able to do so by devising formal rules, which
can broadly be defined as “abstractions that govern”
(Stinchcombe, 2001, p. 43). Furthermore, Stinchcombe
makes the case that institutions are not self-supporting,
emergent structures with a life of their own but in
need of support by actors on the ground. Institutions, in
short, can only survive if organizations deliver services
promised by the institution and if the quality of these ser-
vices is considered acceptable.
Borrowing from the title of Stinchcombe’s book
(2001), we might summarize the thrust of this body of
literature as follows: There are indeed times “when for-
mality works.” There is thus a rich variety of contribu-
tions to organizational research arguing for conceptu-
alizing formal organizations as a modern phenomenon
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that has become institutionalized because it does—at
least some—things more effectively than any other form
of social organization. Formal organizations divide labor,
standardize processes, and employ trained specialists
(Weber); they coordinate human behavior while retain-
ing autonomy in setting and changing goals (Barnard);
they deliver service which could not be bought as eas-
ily on a market (Coase); they compensate the limited
cognitive capacities of individuals (Simon); and they pos-
sess the ability to employ distinct mechanisms of gover-
nance (Stinchcombe).
Summing up, according to new institutionalism, we
would expect the institutionalization of rankings to lean
heavily on the cultural institutionalization of formal or-
ganization. The “old” institutionalism, on the other hand,
would see the institutionalization of rankings as primarily
contingent upon the capabilities of formal organizations,
which are in their effect superior to other forms of so-
cial organizing. In the following, rather than seeing the
two brands as mutually exclusive, we use their insights
as heuristics to analyze the role organizations play in the
institutionalization of rankings. In the process, we wish
to show that institutionalism could in fact be practiced as
a way of theorizing that incorporates insights from both
the “old” and the “new” tradition.
3. The Expansion of Rankings along Three Dimensions
To examine the role organizations play in the institution-
alization of rankings, we reviewed the empirical litera-
ture on rankings with a specific focus on studies exam-
ining their producers. Against this backdrop, we then se-
lectively searched for first-hand information onmuch dis-
cussed and long-lasting rankings in different fields, us-
ing publicly available data (published reports, websites,
and secondary sources). We systematically compared
the cases and organized our insights into several themes.
Discussing these insights, this section specifies a variety
of ways in which organizationsmatter inmaking rankings
a regular feature of many fields in modern society. The
first dimension refers to the fact that rankings usually ad-
dress and simultaneously maintain a problem, thus in-
ducing their regular and continuous publication as op-
posed to some of the earlier experiments with rankings
which tended to be one-off efforts. The second dimen-
sion refers to matters of handling complex tasks, that
is, an evolution from the production of relatively sim-
ple lists, simple indicators, and ranking a relatively small
number of entities, to more complex rankings, based on
composite indicators and with a larger span. The third
dimension, audience engagement, refers to a transition
from relatively narrow expert audiences to larger, more
diverse, non-expert or lay ones. We take each of the
three dimensions in turn and selectively draw fromexam-
ples of rankings that were produced before the ranking-
frenzy of the last thirty years, contrasting them with
more recent rankings in which organizations play more
significant roles.
3.1. Addressing, Producing, and Maintaining
the Problem
Rankings neither appear nor exist in a social vacuum.
They frequently address societal problems that are in
many cases perceived as major or even global chal-
lenges, such as education, corruption, or climate change.
Even national rankings usually refer to issues that are
of universal nature and typically do not touch upon
matters that would only make sense in a local context.
On the contrary, they normally draw from (global) tem-
plates offered by “universalized third parties” (Werron,
2014)—particularly international (governmental or non-
governmental) organizations and universities. We might
therefore suspect that, following the widespread theo-
rization of global challenges in the past decades, rankers
should find it relatively easy to draw from existing tem-
plates in order to define a problem to which their prod-
uct should be an answer or a road to one.
However, rankings do not only address existing is-
sues, but at times they also actively work towards creat-
ing the very problem to which, they claim, their product
is the remedy. In our earlier work on global university
rankings, for example, we demonstrated that, although
such rankings nominally intend to measure something
that is supposedly “out there,” in doing so they discur-
sively construct a distinct notion of scientific “excellence”
(Brankovic et al., 2018). Inmanyways, rankers such as the
Shanghai Ranking or the THE World University Rankings
do not just map the existing global field of universities,
but instead they importantly contribute to its emergence
as a shared social space.
Whether rankings address existing challenges or ac-
tively create new ones, in order for them to survive as
rankers, they have to maintain the “problem.” This, we
argue, is contingent upon their ability to keep the opera-
tion going. A crucial prerequisite of doing so is, logically,
to secure funding. However, as rankings are produced
by a host of different types of organizations, there is no
one clear path for all of them to follow. For-profit orga-
nizations, such as the U.S. News or Mercer make rank-
ings part of their business strategy (for higher education
check, for example, Stack, 2016). Many rankings, on the
other hand, are produced by public and non-profit orga-
nizations such the OECD, Transparency International, or
theWorld Bank, and depend upon an often complex and
dense network of funding bodies, ranging from govern-
ment agencies, prominent international organizations,
private foundations and philanthropies, to corporations.
Yet, however ripe the cultural and symbolic infras-
tructure for the birth of ever new rankings, for rankings
to become effective they also have to be published re-
peatedly and sometimes even regularly (Brankovic et al.,
2018; Werron & Ringel, 2017). Surprisingly, research of-
ten does not take note of the fact that present-day rank-
ings are typically produced weekly, monthly, annually,
or biannually. To pinpoint the struggles such continual
publication creates, it is illuminating to contrast modern-
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day rankings with their predecessors (Brankovic, Ringel,
& Werron, 2019). In fact, many of the early rankings and
similar forms of quantitative evaluation (that is, quanti-
fied comparisons sharing some, though not all properties
of modern rankings), published in the pre-1980s area,
were one-off experiments by individual experts in their
respective fields who had no or, at best, minor organiza-
tional support.
Take the art field for instance: Even though efforts
to establish numerical forms of evaluation in the arts
can be traced back to the eighteenth century, they only
have become successful since the 1970s (when the pe-
riodic art ranking, the German Kunstkompass, was first
published) and particularly in the 2000s (Buckermann,
2019). Spoerhase’s (2018) study on art rankings in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries illustrates this
point. He traces quantified comparisons of (mostly) de-
ceased artists produced by other artists and art critics,
starting with the publication of Roger de Piles’ Balance
des Peintres in 1708 and ending with Jean-Francois
Sobry’s Balance de Peintres, Rectifée in 1810. In a sim-
ilar exercise about a century later, surrealist rankings
published in the journal Littérature, edited by surre-
alist artists André Breton, Lois Aragon, and Philippe
Soupault, were also created as singular experiments
(Schmidt-Burkhardt, 2005).
Science and higher education provide another in-
structive example. A review of higher education rankings
between 1900 and 1980 reveals that almost all of them
had only been published once (Webster, 1986). Among
the first to create such league tables was the psycholo-
gist James Cattell, professor at Columbia University and
editor of the journal Science (Hammarfelt, de Rijcke, &
Wouters, 2017; Ringel & Werron, in press), who pro-
duced a variety of one-off rankings and whose method
was copied by many of his successors. Even in cases
when a ranking exercise was repeated, such as those
by Raymond Hughes, published in 1925 and 1934, and
the so-called Cartter Report, published in 1966 and 1970
(Webster, 1986), the periods between the publication
of the first and the second report—nine years and four
years, respectively—were relatively long and certainly
cannot be considered regular.
What are the reasons for the absence of repetition in
the production of these rankings, both in the arts and in
the scientific field? A tentative answer could be their pur-
pose. Spoerhase (2018) suggests that the rankings and
similar devices he studied did not seem to aim at mea-
suring current performances, to be re-assessed at a later
stage, but rather resembled what we today sometimes
refer to as “best of all times” lists. After publishing such
lists, individual rankers lacked interest in furthering their
assessments. In the scientific field, the previously men-
tioned Cattell produced rankings as part of his studies
on the origins of “eminence,” as a relatively stable cat-
egory and he did not seem to showmuch interest in cap-
turing change as such. Organizations, on the other hand,
have means to “force” their members to have a long-
term interest in rankings: Within a “zone of indifference”
(Barnard, 1938), members of an organization can be ex-
pected to do as they are told irrespective of their emo-
tions, preferences, or (changing) interests.
A second reason for the one-off nature of many of
these early rankings in different fields seems to be that
repeating them would have been not only costly, but
also time-consuming: Producing anything on a regular
basis instead of once obviously has clear implications
for the workload to carry and the money to spend—
especially in the case of individuals for whom produc-
ing rankings is not their sole or even their primary re-
sponsibility. Hammarfelt et al. (2017), for example, de-
tail the amount of time and energy Cattell had to dedi-
cate to produce one ranking. He first had to scan ency-
clopedias, make a list of “eminent” scientists in different
fields, prepare a questionnaire, select those who should
receive it, send out letters to them with specific instruc-
tions, wait for the letter to return, weigh scores, calculate
overall results, and, finally, publish his findings on the
“scientific strength” of universities in the journal Science,
which he only could because he himself was the editor.
The authors suggest that Cattell did not repeat this exer-
cise due to a “lack of data.” They further speculate that
as the biographical directory American Men of Science,
which was the foundation of his sample, grew in size,
Cattell on his own was not able to maintain the “calcu-
lative power” necessary for compiling and reproducing
the ranking. They conclude that “(i)t may have been too
much for Cattell” (Hammarfelt et al., 2017, p. 405).
All of this stands in stark contrast with how today’s
rankers are able to handle their workload. Besides their
superior ability to retain financial resources mentioned
earlier, they often have trained personnel specialized in
and paid for the production of rankings. In their study
of rankings in the IT sector, for instance, Pollock and
D’Adderio (2012) showcase how contemporary ranking
organizations such as Gartner have an “army” of em-
ployees who are responsible for the creation and main-
tenance of so-called “magic quadrants.” This indicates
that in the case of many contemporary rankings, the em-
ployment of those responsible for the production pro-
cess is contingent upon the ranking exercise to be con-
tinued. In turn, if individuals decide to leave the organiza-
tion, they can be replaced by others who continue their
work. Take the Corruption Perception Index: Even after
its well-known founder, Johann Graf Lambsdorff, retired,
and wanted to retire the Index (Global Integrity, 2009),
Transparency International continued the publication.
Not only employees, but also the ranking organiza-
tions themselves may have incentives to commit to con-
tinuing the production. This is especially true when a
ranking becomes so successful that the survival of the
organization depends on it. When it produced its first
college rankings in the early 1980s, U.S. News, a me-
dia company, was in financial trouble. The publication of
its first successful—and still existing and widely read—
ranking practically saved the business. In the coming
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years, U.S. News became increasingly more invested in
the production of rankings (Espeland & Sauder, 2016). In
1990, less than a decade after its first publication, U.S.
News expanded its ranking to include all four-year col-
leges in the U.S., alongside its traditional top 25 lists (Jin
&Whalley, 2007). Pigeon Paradise, an auction house pro-
ducing league tables of pigeon races, is another example
of an organization rapidly expanding through rankings.
They started out in the 2000s as a club ranking pigeon
races in Central Europe. This soon spurred interest in
Asia, which attracted considerable financial resources as
buyers sought the most successful pigeons. The growth
which ensued led to the Pigeon Paradise proclaiming it-
self the “engine of the pigeonmarket” (Bahrami&Meyer,
2019). In these cases, two complementary characteris-
tics of organizations seem to reinforce each other: While
the effectiveness of organizations contributes to the reg-
ular publication of rankings, once established, the rank-
ings use the “self-preserving tendencies” of organiza-
tions for their long-term institutionalization.
3.2. Handling Complex Tasks
Over time, rankings in different fields have arguably be-
come more elaborate and more complex, which can add
to their perceived significance and legitimacy. Ranking
organizations play a crucial role in this development as
they can over time become more efficient in managing
the collection, quantification, evaluation, and aggrega-
tion of ever more information about an increasing num-
ber of cases. To give some examples: The Programme for
International Student Assessment started out as a rank-
ing of 43 OECD and non-OECD countries and in its last
edition in 2015 included 72 countries; the Corruption
Perception Index by Transparency International went
from 41 countries in 1995 to 180 countries and territo-
ries in 2018; and the website ArtFacts, founded in 2001,
constantly increases its sample, currently holding at a
staggering number of 601,331 artists. However, organi-
zations do not only increase the sample of individual
rankings, they also often multiply the population. The
U.S. News, on the other hand, did not merely expand its
original ranking by including more universities, but also
began to “export” rankings into other domains, such as
hospitals, law firms, vacation destinations, and even cars.
In more abstract terms, contemporary rankers often
act as what Latour (1987) refers to as “centres of calcula-
tion,” that is, they mobilize, translate, standardize, quan-
tify, and evaluate information by developing large-scale
networks. Due to their calculative power, formal organi-
zations are able to include a large number of ranked en-
tities. Such requirements greatly surpass the capacities
of single individuals, or even small teams. To produce a
ranking of colleges in the U.S., Kunkel (1915), for exam-
ple, had to rely on his friends:
The data upon which this paper is based were se-
cured from three different volumes of “Who’s Who,”
the only ones at the time available, in order that
I might profit by the very kind assistance ofmy friends,
Mr. and Mrs. Marion H. Hedges, without which I fear
I would not have carried out the investigation. (p. 317)
Such solutions are today, arguably, less common.
Furthermore, producing complex rankings which include
a large number of entities usually requires a high degree
of expertise and specialization. The personnel of rank-
ing organizations is typically highly educated, in posses-
sion of specialized knowledge, and sometimes receives
additional extensive training—thus making up a large la-
bor force that serves as an important infrastructure for
the emergence of evermore rankings. Organizations also
rely on their ability to mobilize the input and cooper-
ation of experts and academics. The Freedom House’s
Freedom in the World Index, for example, assembles “a
team of in-house and external analysts and expert ad-
visers from the academic, think tank, and human rights
communities”; “[t]he 2020 edition involved more than
125 analysts, and 40 advisers” (Freedom House, 2020).
The main task of the analysts is to evaluate their re-
spective countries of expertise by using “a broad range
of sources, including news articles, academic analyses,
reports from nongovernmental organizations, individ-
ual professional contacts, and on-the-ground research”
(FreedomHouse, 2020). The analysts then produce quan-
tified scores, which “are discussed and defended at a
series of review meetings, organized by region and at-
tended by Freedom House staff and a panel of expert
advisers” (Freedom House, 2020). Another example is
the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, which re-
lies on both in-house and external expertise and in doing
so consults thousands of experts who fill out the ques-
tionnaire, interacts with these individuals, and then even
does spot-checks in a variety of countries (World Bank
Group, 2018). Arguably, only an organization that is able
to manufacture high levels of legitimacy, controls vast re-
sources, and has extensive staffing and global networks
of expertise at its disposal could accomplish a task as
complex and resource-intensive.
While centers of calculation still steer the processes
and, to some degree, are able change the outcomes (see
Pollock & D’Adderio, 2012), other organizations create
and maintain what Kornberger, Pflueger, and Mouritsen
(2017) call “evaluative infrastructures”—a mix of tech-
nologies, assemblages, institutional arrangements, cul-
tural rules, norms, habits, and conventions, allowing for
the collection, creation, and procession of large amounts
of data. Typical examples are platform organizations
which depend on users’ sharing their experience. In such
cases, the organizations provide certain rules and fram-
ings (such as algorithms), but the resulting evaluations,
ratings, and rankings emerge in a more or less organic
fashion. TripAdvisor, for instance, has an algorithm that
produces its popularity index which ranks hotels and
restaurants in different areas, relying on user review
(Jeacle & Carter, 2011; Orlikowski & Scott, 2013). Even
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though the production of the Popularity Index proceeds
almost automatically as soon as the algorithm is in place,
TripAdvisor still has to provide a great deal of mainte-
nance work. Moreover, operating at such a large scale
in some sectors, such as tourism, involves setting up con-
tracts with a variety of auxiliary organizations, engaging
in PR activities, providing help desks and counseling in
cases of problems, and dealing with a variety of legal
questions and even lawsuits.
The increasingly complex evaluations and calcula-
tions, and not least their expansion, require a certain
degree of standardization, but also distance from the
object of ranking. Just like any other, ranking organiza-
tions strive to improve their management, as well as
to develop strategies to socialize their members, allow-
ing them to coordinate actions of often large, diverse,
and spatially dispersed groups of people (Ashforth, Sluss,
& Harrison, 2007; Maanen & Schein, 1979). Orlikowski
and Scott (2013) detail the formally standardized learn-
ing process of newly hired staff at the Automobile
Association which publishes a yearly accommodation
guide inGreat Britain. The authors describe awell-honed,
elaborate, and standardized process of peer-learning at
the end of which newcomers become experienced—and
trusted—hotel evaluators. Similarly, in their study on
the Access to Medicine Index, Mehrpouya and Samiolo
show how the Access toMedicine Foundation constantly
reminds its analysts to suppress their subjective im-
pressions and feelings and analyze data as a “robot”
(Mehrpouya & Samiolo, 2016, p. 21). With such prac-
tices in place, ranking organizations are not only able to
standardize the behavior of their employees, but also to
dealwith its fluctuation. Their ability to handle evermore
complex tasks, then, can be seen as both a prerequisite
and an effect of their involvement in the continual pro-
duction of rankings.
3.3. Engaging Large and Diverse Audience
The aforementioned examples from the arts and sci-
ences indicate that the early producers of rankings were
typically experts in the field, addressing a small circle of
people and expert audiences, usually their professional
peers (other artists and scientists, respectively). The com-
pilers of art (proto)rankings, for example, even deem-
phasized the validity of their findings (Spoerhase, 2018),
signaling that they respected institutionalized structures
of connoisseurship at the expense of promoting their
easy-to-understand ranking tables to mass audiences.
Similarly, in the field of science, “early attempts had in
common that they originated from the sciences them-
selves and, although they claimed to be of relevance for
students, their audiencemainly consisted of fellow schol-
ars” (Hammarfelt et al., 2017, p. 406).
Since the 1980s and 1990s, more and more rankings
are explicitly produced for non-expert and in other ways
diverse audiences. In many cases, the very meaning of
the ranking is based on the idea of transforming expert
judgments into information for broader publics. However,
while many accounts emphasize the numerical author-
ity of rankings, empirical studies also highlight their aes-
thetic appeal. In their study on Gartner—an IT industry
ranking organization—Pollock and D’Adderio (2012) de-
scribe how the creators of Magic Quadrants always keep
inmind that a ranking has to deliver a “beautiful image”—
a distribution that makes sense to clients, thus neither
including too many nor too few cases, while offering
a meaningful spread. In a similar vein, Mehrpouya and
Samiolo (2016) show how ranking organizations strive to
create what their informants call a “good distribution.”
In Latoursian terms, ranking organizations invest a great
deal of time and resources to craft rankings as power-
ful and appealing “inscriptions” spanning and travelling
a multiplicity of contexts (Latour, 1987).
In contrast to individual rankers, who seem to focus
more on interacting with other experts, ranking organi-
zations often strive to maintain interest in their product
across several audiences, some of which are more and
some less competent when it comes to understanding
the complex and multifaceted calculations undergirding
rankings. To address various audiences, ranking organiza-
tions either develop hybrid practices, that is, they engage
in activities spanning multiple fields (Furnari, 2014), or
divide labor processes, i.e., they set up different depart-
ments focusing on technical tasks and institutional envi-
ronments amounting to what is often referred to as de-
coupling (Meyer&Rowan, 1977). Crucially, all of the prac-
tices depend on the specific capacities of formal organi-
zations, particular division of labor in professional exper-
tise, ranging from technical abilities (e.g., statistics, ac-
counting) andmanagement to communication skills (e.g.,
scientific, marketing, public relations).
Rankers’ ability to span multiple audiences also al-
lows them to have both the personnel specialized in ad-
hering to a noble cause (for instance, protecting the envi-
ronment, or improving healthcare) and engaging in com-
mercial activities to generate revenue. Their complex
structure enables organizations to even use their prod-
ucts to promote certain causes via rankings and then pro-
vide remedial services. Kornberger and Carter (2010) de-
tail how the Anholt City Brand Index ranks global cities to
promote the idea of a “city brand” and then establishes
itself as a consultancy to help cities improve their brand.
The aforementioned Pigeon Paradise simultaneously ad-
dresses expert audiences (so-called “pigeon fanciers”)
and uses its rankings to increase the valor of pigeons,
which it then auctions off to the highest bidder (wealthy
investors in Asia). These examples indicate that owing to
their diverse and qualified workforce as well as their abil-
ity to coordinate the action of multiple departments via
managerial oversight, organizations are well equipped to
expand into a multiplicity of fields. With modern society
comprising exponentially more fields over time (Christin,
2018; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Krause, 2018), such ca-
pabilities are in great demand when it comes to the han-
dling of devices such as rankings.
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Another important factor for the engagement of
large(r) and (more) diverse audiences is that rankers of-
ten end up attracting attention by creating “news.” In
contrast, early rankings were rarely set up with this goal
in mind. It is therefore little surprising that rankings
which actually gained traction and were published reg-
ularly before the 1980s, such as the Kunstkompass, an
artist ranking by German journalist Willi Bongard, actu-
ally could rely on organizations to deliver certain tasks
such as marketing. In the case of the Kunstkompass, the
journal in which it was published took care of print-
ing, distributing, and promoting the ranking over the
years, allowing Bongard to use his time to engage in
the public discourse surrounding his ranking and to ad-
dress criticism (Wilbers, 2019). Contemporary rankings,
however, are often geared towards maximizing the at-
tention of a large, lay and in many cases also global au-
dience (Brankovic et al., 2018; see also Kornberger &
Carter, 2010). Not only do they take great care of how
they visualize their products, but they usually also em-
ploy communication or PR experts responsible for moni-
toring, evaluating and engaging with stakeholders. Their
tasks include, among others, disseminating reports, com-
municating their product in a language which is more ac-
cessible to a broader audience, organizing events, and
devising elaborate social media strategies.
The production of rankings that reach beyond nar-
row circles of experts, especially those addressing global
and diverse audiences, increases the likelihood of criti-
cism. Almost by definition, regularly published rankings
are in a continuous battle for legitimacy and are of-
ten fiercely debated. The Corruption Perception Index
has been accused of furthering U.S.-American interests
(Gutterman, 2014), while university rankings regularly
face pushback (Dörre, Lessenich,& Singe, 2013; Espeland
& Sauder, 2007). Criticism and efforts to avoid it can
sometimes affect theway a ranking ismade and push the
ranker to be “deliberately less bold” and even—as it was
the case with the aforementioned Hughes’ and Cartters’
reports—to completely refrain from presenting the find-
ings in a rank order (Webster, 1992, p. 252) as a way to
“de-emphasize the pecking-order relationships” (Roose
& Andersen, 1970, p. 2).
Some of the most prominent rankers today certainly
do not shy away from controversy. To address critics
and sceptics, they often devise elaborate strategies. The
earlier mentioned social media activity is one such ex-
ample, while organizing events is another. THE, for in-
stance, organizes summits and launches, which they use
to also get in touch with critics and/or experts, “refine”
their methodology, and see how they can “do it bet-
ter” next time (Lim, 2018). Organizations are in gen-
eral able to counter criticism quite effectively as they
have the means to orchestrate such collective responses
by providing its members who appear in public with
“fronts, appearances, manner, routines” (Manning, 2008,
p. 680), thus allowing them to promote a favorable self-
presentation (Ringel, 2018), even in spite of backlash.
Another strategy is to involve those who could po-
tentially criticize and even de-legitimize the ranking in
its production process. A classification of journals by the
Danish Agency for Science, Technology and Innovation,
for instance, was created by assigning the task of cate-
gorizing journals to scholars from the respective fields
(Jensen, 2011). The agency thus acted as a center of cal-
culation by branching out its calculative processes, while
at the same time creating barriers against criticism: The
evaluation criteria of the journals, if challenged, would
be the responsibility of “the scientific community”—not
of the Agency. Arguably, the ranker, which in this case
was a ministry, granted legitimacy and authority to the
process—something which would be far more difficult
for an individual to achieve.
4. Concluding Discussion and Outlook
The expansion and effectiveness of rankings is certainly
contingent upon their acceptance as a modern rational-
ized institution. Research in the framework of new insti-
tutionalism has time and again demonstrated that col-
lective actors who are perceived as legitimate have eas-
ier access to resources than those who cannot or do
not wish to incorporate institutionalized structures. Even
more fundamentally perhaps, we have to recognize that
“organizations can best communicate with other organi-
zations,” that is, organizations consider other organiza-
tions “the only adequate points of contact” (Kühl, 2015,
p. 263). Hence, it is easier for ranking organizations to
acquire funding and establish cooperation compared to
other types of actors, such as individuals, simply because
they are organizations. As a result, wemight attribute the
dominance of organizations among modern rankers to-
day, to some degree at least, to the symbolic quality of
formal organizations as such.
In this article we have argued that the new institu-
tionalist thesis on the global-cultural institutionalization
of “organization” could benefit from the (often forgot-
ten) insights offered by the “old” institutionalism. We,
however, do not wish to undermine cultural rationaliza-
tion as an important driving force behind global organiza-
tional expansion; organizational expansion as such is, af-
ter all, notwhatwehave tried to account for here. Rather,
we call attention to the aspects of the expansion or “suc-
cess” of contemporary organizational rankers which, we
argue, cannot be accounted for exclusively though the
new institutionalist lens. We neither wish to claim that
rankings become institutionalized because they are pro-
duced by organizations; rather, we argue that organiza-
tional capabilities are an important element in the larger
mechanism of this complex process. Finally, we do not
claim that individuals cannot produce and reproduce
popular rankings, but those are, to our knowledge, ex-
ceptions, rather than a rule.
To elaborate this point further, and drawing on the
empirical evidence mentioned thus far, we suggest that
organizations enable the ongoing production and pro-
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motion of rankings in at least three ways. First, plainly
put, compared to individuals, organizations are able to
do more things at once. Transparency International, for
instance, has a secretariat that is, among other things,
involved in the production of the Corruption Perception
Index; it also has national chapters all over the world en-
gaging in different activities, such as advocacy, network-
ing, engaging with the media, and lobbying. Extreme
cases are large and highly influential international or-
ganizations often employing hundreds of people, with
the World Bank, the OECD, and the United Nations be-
ing well-known examples. For such organizations, pro-
ducing a ranking does not necessarily mean setting other
tasks aside. Take the World Bank: While producing and
promoting Indexes, such as Doing Business Index and
Human Capital Index, it provides loans to countries,
funds all kinds of projects, conducts research, and en-
gages in advocacy.
Second, organizations can do more things at once—
for a longer time. They often outlive individuals—even
their founders—which makes them more likely to sus-
tain a long-term interest in the production of rankings.
Individuals, on the other hand, not only eventually pass
away, but they also may lose interest in the production
of rankings as they become dedicated to other endeav-
ors. The repeatedly mentioned James Cattell is a prime
example: Albeit showing great interest in mapping scien-
tific “eminence,” he was also involved in the promotion
of university reform and anti-war proclamations during
World War I, which eventually consumed much of his
time and even put him in the position of losing his tenure
at Columbia University. Put differently, there are limits to
what a single person, or even a group for thatmatter, can
do in their lifetime—a restriction that does not in princi-
ple apply to formal organizations.
Third, organizations can domore things at once, for a
longer time—and can accumulate more resources, often
from a greater variety of sources. Producing and main-
taining a ranking (or several different rankings) is in cer-
tain cases extremely resource-intensive. Individual pro-
ducers of rankings were therefore either forced to in-
vest their own resources or wait for opportunities to
arise. Cattell, for instance, had the advantage of edit-
ing a leading journal in which he could publish more or
less at his own will. Kunkel, as we have seen, relied on
friends. Individuals, as opposed to organizations, are also
less likely to secure the funding necessary to acquire ex-
pensive instruments and technologies needed to ensure
the calculative power for the production of the rankings
they envision.
In conclusion, while in this article we acknowledge
that the diffusion of rankings in contemporary society
is largely a matter of discursive institutionalization, we
wish to draw attention to the properties, practices, and
strategies devised by the actors responsible for their on-
going production, which have largely remained ignored
by rankings research to date. We therefore argue that
formal organization is, in a way, a vital cog in the en-
gine of modern-day rankings. Having reviewed a large
body of empirical studies on rankings, we have identi-
fied three dimensions alongwhich rankings have evolved
decisively once being produced by organizations: pub-
lication frequency; handling increasingly complex tasks;
and audience engagement. We illustrated how, in con-
trast to rankings produced by individuals, organizations
are better equipped to publish rankings on a continual
basis, handle the increasingly complex production pro-
cess, generate considerable degrees of attention by ad-
dressing larger andmore diverse audiences, and develop
mechanisms to respond to their criticism. In short, there
is reason to believe that the organizational production
of rankings provides an elementary and hitherto over-
looked infrastructure undergirding the discursive institu-
tionalization of rankings. On a theoretical level, there-
fore, our analysis suggests that we are well-advised to re-
connect insights on the legitimacy of institutions as pro-
moted by the “new” institutionalism with the “older” in-
stitutionalism’s emphasis on the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of organization in order to make sense of the per-
vasiveness of institutions such as rankings.
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